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Sampson v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 80 (Dec. 1, 2005)1
CRIMINAL LAW
Summary
Admission of expert testimony is within the sole discretion of the trial judge. Abuse of
discretion does not exist where defense counsel waited until the eighth day of trial to seek to call
a newly-named expert witness without sufficient justification for the delay. The Nevada
Supreme Court adopts the rule against admission of witness and prosecution comments regarding
a defendant’s invocation of Fourth Amendment rights when such evidence is used to support an
inference of guilt. When the district court admits such evidence, this Court will determine the
existence of reversible error by application of the same test used for admission of such evidence
regarding the invocation of Fifth Amendment rights. Reversible error does not exist where a
witness makes comments without being solicited as to the specific details of the invocation and
without the intention of inferring meaning from the defendant’s invocation of rights.
Disposition/Outcome
Judgment of conviction affirmed. First, the district court did not err in refusing to admit
the testimony of a new expert witness eight days into trial. Next, the district court’s admission of
a witness’s testimony regarding the defendant’s invocation of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights was harmless error because the testimony was made in passing.
Factual and Procedural History
Defendant Willie Sampson was accused of sexually victimizing a 9-year-old boy
pursuant to picking the boy up at a bus stop and taking him to McDonald’s. The boy testified to
the following sequence of events: Sampson picked him up on the street and bought the boy food
from McDonald’s; after eating at Sampson’s house, Sampson pointed a gun at the boy and told
him to do whatever Sampson said; Sampson ordered the boy to strip; Sampson covered the boy’s
eyes with a white cloth and ordered the boy into the bathtub to “wash up good”; Sampson got
into the bathtub facing the boy and touched and washed the boy’s buttocks and genitals;
Sampson then ordered the boy to lay down on his back on a bed; Sampson rubbed lotion on and
laid underneath the boy; Sampson placed the boy’s hand on Sampson’s penis and ordered the
boy to masturbate him; when the boy refused, Sampson forced the boy to masturbate him until
Sampson ejaculated; Sampson placed his penis near the boy’s mouth and repeatedly demanded
oral sex; the boy refused; Sampson then gave the boy a pair of Sampson’s silver boxer shorts and
a tee shirt; Sampson allowed the boy to watch television; when the boy asked Sampson for chips,
Sampson compiled a grocery list of items the boy requested, tied the boy to a chair, and left the
apartment to go to the store; and finally the boy freed himself and returned to his home.
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On cross-examination, inconsistencies between the victim’s testimony during trial, his
testimony at the preliminary hearing, and the recorded statement he gave police following the
incident were revealed.
Sampson testified at trial, and his version of events differed greatly from the boy’s.
Essentially, Sampson testified that the boy motioned to him to stop his car, asked him for a ride
to McDonald’s, and asked to come to Sampson’s home when Sampson informed him that he had
to go home and work. Sampson claimed that after eating, he asked the boy to call home, but the
boy refused, that he offered to wash the boy’s clothes at a neighbor’s house because the boy
smelled dirty and his clothes were filthy, that the boy took a bath alone, that he gave the boy
some of his clothes to wear while the boy’s clothes were being washed, and that the boy noticed
a chair with ropes on it that Sampson used for sexual activities with a female acquaintance and
played with it until Sampson told him to leave it alone. He denied ever attempting to have sex
with the boy or touching him in any way.
On the eighth day of trial, Sampson sought to introduce the boy’s school records and an
expert witness, Dr. Racoma. Both identified the boy as having a diagnosis of Oppositional
Defiant Disorder (ODD), an illness that is characterized by lying. Sampson sought to allege that
the boy had lied about the alleged abduction and molestation. The court denied both requests.
During trial, two officers testified that they spoke with Sampson at the crime scene to
request permission to conduct an unwarranted search but that Sampson denied this request. A
different officer testified that he did not speak with Sampson at the crime scene because
Sampson was already in a patrol car and had requested an attorney. Although defense counsel
moved for a mistrial at this point, the court denied the motion.
Sampson now appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence of multiple life terms,
entered after jury verdict, for one count of first-degree kidnapping, two counts of lewdness with
a minor, one count of attempted sexual assault on a minor under the age of fourteen, and one
count of sexual assault on a minor under the age of fourteen. Sampson argues that this Court
should reverse his conviction on the grounds that the district court did not allow him to introduce
his expert witness and that the State’s witnesses commented on his invocation of Fourth and
Fifth Amendment rights.
Discussion
Exclusion of Expert Testimony
Sampson’s first argument on appeal is that the district court erred by refusing to allow
him to call Dr. Racoma to testify about the boy’s behavioral disorder. As the admission of
expert testimony lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, the Supreme Court reviews
the court’s decision for abuse of discretion only.2 When making such a determination, the Court
remains cognizant of the defendant’s constitutional right to discredit his accuser.3 While there is
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a strong presumption favoring the admission of even late-disclosed witnesses,4 the Court must be
sure neither to waste judicial time nor to permit attacks on character unrelated to credibility.5
Nevada statutory law mandates that defense counsel and counsel for the state submit to
the court and serve on opposing counsel written notice of all witnesses that each intends to call at
least 5 days prior to trial. Counsel must submit and serve 21 days before trial a list of expert
witnesses that each intends to call.6 The court may choose among various penalties for a
violation of these rules, including “prohibit[ing] the party from introducing in evidence the
material not disclosed.”7
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sampson’s request for
admission. Although defense counsel was unable to ascertain Dr. Racoma’s identity until the
eighth day of trial because of a misspelling in the boy’s school records, defense counsel could
have located Dr. Racoma based on the misspelled records. Defense counsel could have obtained
evidence of the ODD diagnosis by questioning the boy’s mother. Additionally, admission would
have resulted in unfair surprise for the prosecution. It is defense counsel’s error, not the Court’s,
for failing to submit evidence contained in the boy’s school records and failing to timely pursue
testimony from Dr. Racoma.
Testimony relating to Sampson’s invocation of Fourth Amendment rights
Sampson’s second argument on appeal is that the district court erred by admitting
testimony by police officers regarding Sampson’s invocation of his Fourth Amendment right to
refuse to consent to a warrantless search. Because defense counsel failed to object to the
testimony during trial, Sampson bears the burden of establishing that plain error affecting his
substantial rights occurred.8
Today, this Court adopts the rule against admission of a defendant’s invocation of his or
her Fourth Amendment right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search when used to support an
inference of guilt. This brings Nevada courts in line with those Circuit and state courts that have
addressed the issue.9 It is improper to punish a defendant for asserting his or her constitutional
rights.10 Just as defendants may invoke their Fifth Amendment rights to conceal evidence of
wrongdoing,11 so may defendants invoke their Fourth Amendment rights. However, this
prohibition of comments on defendants’ exercise of Fourth Amendment rights does not apply
when defendants put their compliance with a search into issue.
This Court shall measure whether reference to a defendant’s invocation of Fourth
Amendment rights is harmless error by the same test used to determine whether reference to an
invocation of Fifth Amendment rights requires reversal: reversal of conviction is not required if,
“(1) at trial there was only a mere passing reference, without more, to an accused’s post-arrest
silence, or (2) there is overwhelming evidence of guilt.”12 Here, there was not overwhelming
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evidence of guilt, but instead the conviction was based on the jury’s decision to assign greater
credibility to the boy than to Sampson. Thus, this decision addresses only what constitutes “a
mere passing reference.”13
Although the admission of the officers’ testimony was error, it was a mere passing
reference and thus does not mandate reversal. The officers’ comments were made in response to
inquiries concerning whether they spoke to Sampson and what he said to them. The questioning
was not aimed at bringing out his invocation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
Testimony relating to Sampson’s invocation of Fifth Amendment rights
The test to determine whether a witness’s or a prosecutor’s reference to a defendant’s
invocation of Fifth Amendment rights is harmless error is whether: “(1) at trial there was only a
mere passing reference, without more, to an accused’s post-arrest silence, or (2) there is
overwhelming evidence of guilt.”14 The Court will more likely find reversible error where “the
language used was manifestly intended to be or was of such a character that the jury would
naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the defendant’s [assertion of her Fifth
Amendment rights].”15 To constitute reversible error, the comments must have been intended to
draw a meaning from the silence.16 The court will view the comments in context, and will not
undertake reversal lightly.17
Here, the officer’s comment was a mere passing reference and does not mandate reversal.
He made the statement without solicitation by the prosecution and in the context of explaining
what he did when he arrived at the scene and whether he made contact with Sampson at that
time. His comments were not intended to draw meaning from Sampson’s silence, and they were
not of a character that the jury would naturally take them to do so.
Conclusion
The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Defendant Sampson to
introduce a new expert witness eight days into trial because the delay was without good excuse,
and it would have resulted in unfair surprise for the prosecution. This Court adopts the rule
against admission of comments regarding a defendant’s invocation of Fourth Amendment rights
when such evidence is used to support an inference of guilt. The district court did err in
admitting witness testimony regarding Defendant Sampson’s invocation of his Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights, but all comments were made in mere passing reference and thus constitute
harmless, irreversible error.
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